Both Sides of The Coin: The Story of The Central Bank of Barbados 1972-2017

146 not being more independent should first understand the restrictions which the Central Bank Act placed on the institution. He pointed out that no major monetary policy was possible without the minister’s approval. Under Section 49 of the Act, the minister could order the governor to take a particular course of action, as long as those instructions were published in the Official Gazette and laid before Parliament. Blackman restated his view that the governor’s position should be constitutionally-entrenched, with the Board of Directors protected from arbitrary removal; he also advocated for limits on Government borrowing from the Bank. Demas did not agree that the directors should be free from recall, pointing out that the fundamental issue in the debate was that the minister, not the governor, was answerable to the electorate for the Bank’s actions. Demas also held the view that part of the price which a governor paid for independence was a willingness to resign from office. Howard suggested that the relative weakness of monetary policy in LDCs was an argument against greater autonomy for central banks. Later in the year, when King was leaving office, he issued a statement on the subject, suggesting changes to the Act which would require the minister and the Bank to publicise any serious disagreement between them, with appropriate safeguards to protect the integrity of the financial system. He explained that Blackman’s reference, a decade earlier, to being Left to right: Dr. Michael Howard, Sir Courtney, Governor King, Governor Demas and Dr. Worrell.